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Innovations in digital health, such as the introduction of smart infusion pumps, have the potential 
to improve patient safety, even though the evidence base remains weak.(1)  Equally, however, 
new risks can be introduced, which might contribute to adverse events and patient harm.(2, 3)  
The Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch (HSIB), which carries out independent investigations 
into patient safety concerns in the NHS in England, published in December 2020 its findings from 
a national investigation into the procurement, usability and adoption of smart infusion pumps.(4)  
The report includes safety observations (suggested actions for wider learning and improvement) 
that suggest the use of (clinical) safety cases in order to demonstrate that patient safety risks have 
been addressed rigorously and proactively.   
 
Safety cases are a common regulatory instrument used in UK safety-critical industries, as well as 
other countries such as Norway, Australia and New Zealand.(5)  Previous attempts at importing 
safety management practices from other industries to healthcare have not always delivered the 
anticipated benefits, e.g. the application of Failure Mode & Effects Analysis(6) or the adoption of 
incident reporting systems.(7)  It is important to understand both the principles underlying such 
approaches and the context within which they were developed, as well as the unique cultural and 
institutional context that is specific to healthcare.(8, 9) 
 
In this paper, we review the thinking that underpins the use of safety cases across different safety-
critical industries, and then reflect on their potential use for assuring the safety of digital health 
innovations.  This builds in part on a previous review,(10) but also considers the recent debate 
about the need for an evidence base for safety case adoption.  We focus on digital health 
innovations, because safety cases are likely to be particularly relevant for software-based systems 
including, more recently, machine learning technologies, due to their increased complexity, fast 
pace of technological change and potential interactions with other systems.  For example, the 
HSIB report looks specifically at the role of digital drug libraries used by smart infusion pumps.     
 
Safety cases can work in healthcare, but they will require tailoring to account for the different 
regulatory landscape and the way patient safety is framed and evidenced.(10)  We suggest that 
safety cases might be put to best use (at least in the short term) as safety improvement tools, 
rather than as a regulatory (and mandatory) instrument.        
 
WHAT ARE SAFETY CASES?  
 
Safety cases form part of a proactive safety management approach.  The purpose of a safety case 
is to communicate why a product, system or service is deemed acceptably safe for use in a 
particular environment.  A safety case comprises two complementary components: (i) a 
structured and explicit argument that (ii) is supported by a body of evidence.  The argument is 
usually risk-based, and is intended to demonstrate that all relevant risks have been understood 
and dealt with sufficiently.  The evidence can come from diverse safety management activities, 
such as hazard and risk analyses, design specifications, testing and empirical evaluation.  For 
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complex settings, such evidence is rarely self-evident, and hence the argument helps explain, 
appraise and challenge the extent to which the evidence is able to support the safety claims.   
 
There are over one thousand medical device standards, several hundred of which are used for 
regulatory purposes.   Many of the standards cover horizontal issues, e.g. electrical safety, i.e. they 
cover one specific hazard.  These standards contain requirements, which – when followed – are 
intended to demonstrate compliance with regulations.  While standards such as ISO 14971 
(Medical Devices – Application of Risk Management to Medical Devices) take a risk-based approach, 
the lack of regulatory expectation for providing an explicit argument for how the body of evidence 
meets the regulatory requirements can reduce transparency and weaken confidence.  As an 
analogy, the safety case can be thought of as the discussion in a research paper, as it explains and 
critically appraises the safety-related evidence and reflects on the limitations of the safety 
evidence and the safety activities that produced the evidence.      
 
WHERE ARE SAFETY CASES BEING USED? 
 
A review by the Health Foundation describes safety case practices across six industries:  
automotive, civil aviation, defence, nuclear, petrochemical and railways.(5)  Safety cases are used 
widely across these safety-critical industries, particularly in the UK (see a review(10) for further 
details).  The UK nuclear industry adopted safety cases in 1965, following the Windscale fire 
accident in 1957.  Accidents were major drivers for the adoption of safety cases also in other 
industries, such as offshore oil and gas production (Piper Alpha oil platform explosion 1988) and 
railways (e.g. King’s Cross escalator fire 1987; Clapham main line derailment 1988).  In the 
automotive domain, the increased complexity of interconnected electronics and software 
components was reflected in a requirement for an automotive safety case specified in the 
international standard on automotive functional safety (ISO 26262).  
 
In healthcare, the application of safety cases has been limited.  In 2010 (draft version, then 
finalised in 2014) the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the United States issued guidance 
to manufacturers of infusion pumps that recommends the use of an assurance (safety) case as 
part of the pre-market notification 510(k) submission route.  This was triggered by high numbers 
of reported incidents involving such devices.  However, the impact on adverse event rates has not 
been evaluated since.   
 
In England, NHS Digital issued two risk management standards for health information 
technology, which specify safety assurance requirements and practices including the 
development of clinical safety cases for both manufactures and health organisations (referred to 
as DCB 0129 and DCB 0160, respectively).  Although compliance with these requirements is 
mandated by NHS England, the standards are only enforced for systems that directly connect to 
the national infrastructure.  
 
WHY DO SAFETY-CRITICAL INDUSTRIES DO SAFETY CASES?  
 
The use of safety cases is usually part of a regulatory approach that is known as “goal-based” as 
opposed to the more traditional prescriptive regulatory approach.  Prescriptive regulation sets 
out in standards detailed requirements for which risks need to be controlled, and how.  Such 
prescriptive standards are based on past experiences and work well for established and well-
understood systems.  However, in settings where there is a fast pace of technological innovation 
and change, prescriptive standards quickly become outdated and might even hinder innovation.  
Goal-based approaches are more flexible, because they only specify what needs to be achieved, 
but leave open how this is done.  If there are applicable standards, which are deemed relevant, 
there is still the expectation that these are complied with.  Otherwise, a good argument needs to 
be provided for why the standards are not followed.  
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Part of the regulatory requirements in a safety case regime is the duty to demonstrate that risks 
have been reduced as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP), or similar wording with the same 
intent.  This means that operators of hazardous systems need to consider all reasonable ways of 
reducing risk, even if these are not prescribed in existing standards.   
 
In the literature, a range of different reasons for why industries have adopted safety cases can be 
found.(11)  Among these are expectations that safety cases:  
 promote structured risk assessment and management;   
 tell the story of a system’s safety to a wider and diverse readership; 
 show how high-level safety requirements are implemented in the detailed design; 
 establish confidence in safety; 
 stimulate critical thought around safety; 
 explain safety evidence; and 
 focus regulatory inspection.   
        
DO SAFETY CASES IMPROVE SAFETY? 
 
Even though safety cases have been used across diverse industries for many years, there is a lack 
of conclusive evidence that the use of safety cases improves outcomes.(12)  There are two reasons 
for this.  First, safety cases are used traditionally for high-hazard settings, where the focus is on 
high-severity, low-frequency events, i.e. the rare, but catastrophic failure of a system, such as the 
loss of an aircraft.  Given the low frequency of such events, it is difficult to provide meaningful 
statistical data about the impact of a regulatory instrument, such as safety cases.(13)  Second, the 
practice of safety cases is very varied, and it is frequently not explicitly articulated what kinds of 
benefits safety cases might have (see above) and how these are achieved.(12)  Consequently, the 
adoption of safety cases is usually based on a face-validity principle, i.e. regulators and industry 
act on the assumption that it is a good idea to use safety cases.   
 
Critics point to this lack of evidence as well as to the fact that high-profile accidents continue to 
happen in countries that require safety cases.(14, 15)  A frequently used example is the 
catastrophic loss of a Royal Air Force Nimrod aircraft in Afghanistan in 2006.  The independent 
Haddon-Cave review(16) highlighted significant weaknesses in safety case practices as part of 
wider criticisms of poor risk management systems across the different organisations that were 
involved in the design, operation and assessment of the aircraft.  Such a culture was found to 
undermine the intended value of a safety case leading to a “tick-box” and compliance-driven 
approach to safety.     
     
MAKING SAFETY CASES WORK IN HEALTHCARE 
In the NHS in England, the clinical safety case concept promoted by NHS Digital is suggested for 
wider use in the HSIB safety observation.  However, bearing in mind the complexity and contested 
nature of safety case practices in safety-critical industries there is a danger that in healthcare the 
concept will be misunderstood, misused and ultimately fail to make care safer.   
 
An Australian report identifies five key criteria for successful safety case regimes:(13) (i) an 
established risk or hazard management framework; (ii) a legal requirement to make the case to 
the regulator; (iii) a competent and independent regulator; (iv) workforce involvement; and (v) 
a general duty of care imposed on the operator.  It is clear that most health systems do not 
currently meet these success criteria, not least because much of the patient safety improvement 
work is driven by outcomes (reactive) rather than by consideration of risk in processes and 
systems (proactive), while regulators also do not provide incentives for reducing risk as such.(17) 
 
Bearing in mind the differences between safety-critical industries and healthcare, the Health 
Foundation convened in 2013 a multi-professional working group to investigate the potential use 
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of safety cases in healthcare,(18) and the findings remain highly relevant.  The report suggested 
that the health sector might benefit from the use of safety cases because they provide a structure 
for proactively assessing risk, they can have a positive impact on safety culture, and because they 
bring together and synthesise a range of information and evidence relating to a particular service.  
These benefits might best be realised when safety cases are used as part of service improvement 
or as part of an assurance process.  For example, a review of clinical safety cases submitted to 
NHS Digital found that many organisations were struggling to define the functionality of health 
information technology and how it integrates into their local clinical context.(19)  This is reflected 
by the HSIB report, which suggests that the investigated organisations lacked an understanding 
of how smart pump functionality might differ from current practice, who the users of the smart 
pumps were, how smart pumps would interface and interact with other IT systems, and what 
risks might need to be addressed.  Irrespective of regulatory requirements, the use of clinical 
safety cases could support organisations in considering more adequately the scope of change that 
comes with the adoption of digital health technologies, and making explicit their risk position so 
that risks do not go undetected or undocumented.    This is illustrated in Table 1 based on the 
reference investigations described in the HSIB report (4).   
 
Table 1: A clinical safety case could help make an organisation's risk position explicit: smart infusion pump example 
Stage of safety assurance process Smart infusion pump example 
Scope definition Consideration of smart infusion pumps as a system 
that includes drug libraries developed by the 
hospital team, and that interfaces with other IT 
systems.   
Understanding of who the users are (e.g. doctors as 
well as nurses).  
Appreciation of local context and working practices.  
Hazard identification and risk analysis Consideration of wider system hazards rather than 
exclusive focus on technical smart pump failures, 
e.g. doctors getting confused about drug 
concentrations due to use of non-standardised drug 
libraries.   
Risk control Traceability between identified hazards, associated 
risks and corresponding risk controls put in place, 
or justification for why risk controls not put in place, 
e.g. reasons for why non-standardised drug libraries 
are used and how risks arising from this are going to 
be controlled.   
Post-deployment monitoring Routine audit can be used to check and challenge 
assumptions, e.g. routine audit of smart pump event 
log can provide insights into whether there are 
more frequent overrides than anticipated.   
Modification Consideration of risks associated with modification 
or lack of modification of the system, e.g. plans for 
regular and timely update of smart pump drug 
libraries over the existing IT network.   
 
 
However, in order to facilitate and achieve successful adoption of safety case practices in 
healthcare, suggestions for the use of clinical safety cases (as in the HSIB safety observations) 
need to be underpinned by additional work and changes to the (patient) safety management 
infrastructure:  
 Evidence base: Researchers need to articulate the mechanisms by which safety cases can 
improve outcomes and build a persuasive evidence base about benefits and the conditions 
Accepted manuscript: Sujan MA, Habli I.  Safety cases for digital health innovations: can the 
work? BMJ Qual Saf 2021; doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2021-012983 
that create the most fertile ground for using safety cases.  In this respect, healthcare might 
be better placed than other industries, because the rigorous evaluation of complex 
interventions has gained a lot of traction in recent years, and because (sadly) adverse 
events happen at a rate that is more amenable to statistical analysis. 
 Capability: Safety experts and patient safety specialists need to identify the level of 
training and support that healthcare staff and regulators require in order to support and 
to implement a safety case approach.  In England, bodies such as NHS Digital and Health 
Education England should consider how capability can be built at scale.  NHS Digital offer 
courses, but these might not scale up, and there are few publicly available examples of 
clinical safety cases.  Health Education England have developed the national patient safety 
syllabus, which includes consideration of proactive safety management and safety cases, 
but questions remain about how the syllabus can be implemented and delivered across 
the NHS.  Internationally, the patient safety curriculum developed by the World Health 
Organisation could potentially be a vehicle, but does not currently include safety cases.       
 Criteria for risk reduction: Health systems should develop and adopt a healthcare-specific 
notion of acceptable levels of risk, and a framework that can be used in the decision-
making process about the management of risk.  In safety-critical industries decisions 
about risk reduction are based on the ALARP principle, but the health systems face 
different challenges, such as the duty to provide care to an ageing population with 
complex health needs while at the same time being bound by a budget set by the 
government.  There is a need for a broader dialogue around the criteria based on which 
healthcare organisations should manage the trade-off between risk reduction and cost, 




The national investigation into smart infusion pumps suggests the use of safety cases, which is an 
accepted practice in UK safety-critical industries.  Safety cases can support the safe adoption of 
digital health innovations, but any such suggestion needs to be underpinned by far-reaching 
structural changes.  These include the rigorous evaluation of safety case practices and their 
impact on outcomes, the scaling up of education and capability around proactive patient safety 
management practices, and the establishment of an agreed framework for how to make and 
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